Could We Alone Have This? Comparative Legal Analysis of Product Liability Law and the Case for Modest Reform by Babcock, Charles W.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Review Law Reviews
3-1-1988
Could We Alone Have This? Comparative Legal
Analysis of Product Liability Law and the Case for
Modest Reform
Charles W. Babcock
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Charles W. Babcock, Could We Alone Have This? Comparative Legal Analysis of Product Liability Law and the Case for Modest Reform, 10
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 321 (1988).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol10/iss2/2
Could We Alone Have This? Comparative
Legal Analysis of Product Liability Law
and the Case for Modest Reform
CHARLES W. BABCOCK*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the Ford Administration,I and thus for more than a dec-
ade, many groups and individuals have urged reform of United States
product liability law and practice. 2 That body of law developed over
the years without significant societal objection until the introduction
of the concept of "strict liability,"' 3 first in a 1963 California case,4
then by the American Law Institute the following year, 5 and finally in
* A.B., University of Missouri; J.D., Harvard University; Assistant General Counsel,
General Motors Corporation. The research assistance of Christine M. Weinert, Esq., and of
the counsel noted seriatim throughout the article, is gratefully acknowledged. The article re-
flects the views of the author, but not necessarily those of his client.
1. It was in April 1976 that the Inter-agency Task Force on Product Liability was ap-
pointed. See generally Schwartz, The Federal Government and the Product Liability Problem:
From Task-Force Investigation to Decisions by the Administration, 47 U. CIN. L. REv. 573
(1978-79).
2. For example, recent federal product liability reform vehicles have included S. 2631,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. 44, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 100, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985); S. 1999, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S. 2760, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); H.R. 1115,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). There has been much activity in the states as well.
3. Prosser defines strict liability as "liability that is imposed on an actor apart from
either (1) an intent to interfere with a legally protected interest without a legal justification for
doing so, or (2) a breach of duty to exercise reasonable care." R. KEETON, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON TORTS, 534 (West 5th ed. 1984).
4. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1963).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964). At the time the Institute added
the strict liability rule to its "restatement" of existing law, only one jurisdiction, California,
actually had adopted the rule. The Reporter for the Second Restatement was Professor Pros-
ser and the Chief Advisor was Chief Justice Traynor, author of the adopting opinion. See
Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d 57. "When social thinkers cannot find precedent for new theories of
law, they look for almost-precedent and try most creatively to stretch it into something that
looks like it was always there, waiting to be recognized." In fact, this statement was made
nearly 20 years later in opposition to one of the federal product liability reform bills. Product
Liability Act: Hearings on S. 44 Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 194 (1983) (statement of H.
Specter, President, Assn. of Trial Lawyers of Am., in response to questions of Senator Hol-
lings) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 44].
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an avalanche of state decisions before6 and after the beginning of the
next decade.7 The reform movement s is prompted by a profound con-
cern that the concept of "strict liability,"9 together with various rules
that developed in conjunction with it, may not be of long-term net
value to the United States in light of increasing international eco-
nomic competition.
As the debates over product liability reform continue, it may be
helpful to consider how product-related accident claims are treated in
the legal systems of other technologically advanced nations. Little
such analysis seems to have been performed. Perhaps the clearest
comparative analysis can be made if one employs a single hypothetical
factual situation to examine seriatim, the way a civil action based
upon those facts would be treated in each nation under study. That is
the technique employed in this article.
One could agree readily that two automobiles traveling along
6. E.g., Clary v. Fifth Ave. Chrysler Center, Inc., 454 P.2d 244 (Alaska 1969); 0. S.
Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P.2d 248 (1968); Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284,
216 A.2d 189 (1965); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965);
Dealers Transp. Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. 1965); McCormack v. Hank-
scraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967); State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d
113 (Miss. 1966), cert. denied sub nom. Yates v. Hodges, 386 U.S. 912 (1967); Keener v. Day-
ton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969); Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski,
82 Nev. 439, 420 P.2d 855 (1966); Buttrick v. Arthur Lessard & Sons, Inc., 110 N.H. 36, 260
A.2d 111 (1969); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965);
Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 6 Ohio St. 2d 227, 218 N.E.2d 185 (1966); Heaton v. Ford
Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967); Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966);
Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966); McKisson v. Sales Affili-
ates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967); Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wash. 2d 522, 452 P.2d
729 (1969); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
7. E.g., West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So.2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Stewart v. Budget
Rent-A-Car, 52 Haw. 71, 470 P.2d 240 (1970); Shields v. Morton Chem. Co., 95 Idaho 674,
518 P.2d 857 (1974); Cornette v. Searjeant Metal Prods. Inc., 147 Ind. App. 46, 258 N.E.2d
652 (1970); Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa 1970); Brooks v.
Dietz, 218 Kan. 698, 545 P.2d 1104 (1976); Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363
A.2d 955 (1976); Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268
(1973); Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 187 Neb. 428, 191 N.W.2d 601 (1971); Stang v. Hertz
Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 497 P.2d 732 (1972); Johnson v. American Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57
(N.D. 1974); Ritter v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 109 R.I. 176, 283 A.2d 255 (1971); Engberg v.
Ford Motor Co., 87 S.D. 196, 205 N.W.2d 104 (1973).
8. Principal reforms typically sought include a return to a fault-based system of liability,
abrogation or modification of the joint and several liability rule, clear standards for the recov-
ery of punitive damages, reasonable limitation of damage awards for non-economic injury,
reform of the "collateral source" rule and the reduction or elimination of awards to persons
harmed by reason of voluntary alcohol or drug ingestion.
9. The concept of strict liability was first articulated in a concurring opinion filed by
newly-appointed California Supreme Court Justice Traynor in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944).
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separate rural roadways that intersect at some point could collide at
that intersection, and that in the collision their occupants could be
injured. Let us then assume this hypothetical two-car collision at an
uncontrolled rural intersection.10 Let us suppose that the same crash
occurs ten times. Let us then hypothesize that each of these ten colli-
sions is identical in all respects. The automobiles will be identical; the
velocities, vehicular masses, angles of impact, occupant numbers and
sizes, occupant kinematics, tire-to-road coefficients of friction and all
other factors will be identical. Thus, the presumed human injuries
will be identical.
One of the collisions is presumed to occur in each of the follow-
ing advanced industrial nations:
Australia
Belgium
England
Federal Republic of Germany
France
Japan
New Zealand
Sweden
The two remaining collisions are presumed to occur in contiguous
states that lie at the center of the United States: one in Missouri and
the other in Kansas. To eliminate needless conflicts of law, intra-na-
tional facts are presumed for each foreign case and intrastate facts for
each United States case.
Four of the nations whose laws we shall examine are members of
the European Economic Community (EEC), part of the Council of
the European Communities (EC).11 In 1985, the Council adopted a
Directive 12 intended to harmonize "the laws of the member states
concerning" product liability. 13 By July 31, 1988, product liability
laws in these four nations will have been changed in various respects
to conform with the Directive. This article examines both the effect
of present product liability law and the likely 1988 modifications in
10. The rural setting obviously has no particular legal significance. It is selected merely
because a virtually identical environment is present in each of the ten jurisdictions whose laws
are to be examined.
11. The four are Belgium, France, Germany and the United Kingdom.
12. 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 210) 29 (1985) (EEC Product Liability Directive 85/374
(EEC)) [hereinafter Directive].
13. Id. preamble.
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these four nations.
14
Much of the debate regarding the proper scope of product liabil-
ity law, in the United States and elsewhere, involves the availability of
insurance.15 Let us then examine the ten applications of product lia-
bility law to the hypothetical collisionfrom the viewpoint of a prudent
international insurer, one that intends and hopes to remain solvent.
As a matter of incidental interest, automotive accident statistics
both in the United States and elsewhere clearly demonstrate that de-
fects present when motor vehicles are new (the usual subjects of prod-
ucts litigation) are but an infinitesimally small contributor to highway
death and injury.1 6 The leading contributors are: (1) driving under
the influence of alcohol,' 7 and, (2) the failure to employ available re-
straints-that is, seat or safety belts.'I As the litigation risks for man-
ufacturers and their insurers in the various nations are examined, the
sanctions, if any, imposed for these two leading causes of highway
death and injury, each of which will be found in the hypothetical case,
will also be examined.
To avoid needless repetition, the hypothetical facts are stated
only once, in the following paragraph. The reader is asked to con-
14. See infra text accompanying notes 108-92.
15. See, e.g., Product Liability Reform: Hearings on S. 2631 Before the Subcomm. for
Consumers of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 85-86, 88 (1982) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 2631] (statement of C. Bendorf, President,
Ass'n of Trial Lawyers of Am.); Product Liability Reform Act: Hearings on S. 2760 Before the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 302-03 (1986) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 2760]
(statement of R. Habush, Ass'n of Trial Lawyers of Am.); Uniform Product Safety Act of 198 7:
Hearings on H.R. 1115 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Compet-
itiveness of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 90 (1987)
[hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 1115] (statement of R. Habush, Ass'n of Trial Lawyers of Am.).
16. See, e.g., Treat, A Study of Precrash Factors Involved in Traffic Accidents, 10 HSRI
RESEARCH REV. 1 (1980).
17. See, e.g., NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS, NATIONAL HIGH-
WAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, DRUNK DRIV-
ING FACTS 1 (1986):
During the period 1982 through 1985, approximately 95,000 people lost their lives in
alcohol-related traffic crashes .... Traffic crashes are the greatest single cause of
death for people between the ages of five and thirty-four. More than half of these
fatalities are alcohol-related .... In 1985, approximately 43,800 people died in traffic
crashes [and] an estimated 51 percent were alcohol-related (22,360 deaths).
Id. In October 1987, the Center announced that alcohol-related traffic deaths in 1986 in-
creased to 23,990. Deaths From Drunken Driving Increase, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1987, at 12,
col. 1.
18. See, e.g., NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS, NATIONAL HIGH-
WAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, OCCUPANT
PROTECTION FACTS 1 (1987). "At the high use levels achieved in some other countries (85%),
belts could have saved 10,000 lives if all States had belt laws in 1986." Id.
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sider the same hypothetical case, seriatim, with appropriately substi-
tuted place names before each of the succeeding legal analyses.
II. FOREIGN PRODUCT RELATED ACCIDENT CLAIMS
A. New Zealand 19
A, a New Zealand national, was driving his automobile along a
highway in New Zealand. As A approached an uncontrolled rural
intersection, his car was struck by a car driven by B, also a New Zea-
land national. A's right leg was crushed and he suffered other serious
orthopedic injuries, for which he was hospitalized several weeks.
Shortly after the accident, a scientifically and legally proper intoxica-
tion test was administered to B. The test demonstrated a blood alco-
hol concentration of 0.08%. Neither A nor B was wearing his
available lap-shoulder restraint. Neither was driving in the course of
his employment. After the collision, the transaxle on A's car was
found broken. A's car was built in New Zealand by C company, a
New Zealand corporation, and sold by C to an authorized New Zea-
land dealer, who sold the car new, in New Zealand, to A. Among the
private records of C company there is a document written by a New
Zealand national, an automotive design engineer in C's employ who
worked on the design of this car model. It says:
There is concern among several of us that the metal to be used for
this transaxle is not so strong as in previous model cars, so we are
concerned that it may not be able to endure repeated road stresses.
This weaker material might fail in use and cause serious accidents.
There is nothing in C company records to indicate whether the engi-
neers' concerns were resolved. A's extensive medical costs were paid
in part by proceeds from a private medical insurance policy A had
with D company.
E insurance company is product liability insurer to the manufac-
turer C company. If A files a product liability action against C com-
pany, what is the extent of C's risk? That is, what could the outcome
be, under New Zealand law? Because E is a financial organization
and premiums are calculated and paid in monetary units, the answer
should be stated in financial terms. That is, for E to perform rational
rate-making, it has to know not only whether C is likely to lose the
case but how much C is likely to be required to pay if it does lose.
19. The author relied upon the assistance of Rudd, Watts & Stone, Barristers &
Solicitors, Wellington, for the interpretation of New Zealand law.
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And, of incidental interest, what civil or criminal sanctions, if any, are
likely because B had a 0.08% blood alcohol level and neither A nor B
was safety belted?
Any such attempted lawsuit for personal injury by A against C
would be dismissed summarily in New Zealand, a common law coun-
try. Perhaps heeding the ancient philosopher, 20 New Zealand prohib-
ited court proceedings for personal injury by accident years ago.
21
The costs of A's medical care will be borne by the national compensa-
tion system for accident victims.22
For property damage claims, however, traditional common law
rules would apply. 23 Thus, there could be an action for property dam-
age. 24 A could claim that some defect in his car caused the accident
and thus the extensive damage to it. To prevail in that proceeding, A
would have to show that C was negligent in some way in its manufac-
ture of A's car. 25 An insurer may choose to investigate to see whether
there was the expectation of and the opportunity for intermediate in-
spection of A's car by the selling dealer or pursuant to a maintenance
schedule, for the existence of either will exonerate C.26
The engineer's comment would be subject to production in such
a case.27 Since the document is several years old, counsel for C and E
would want to interview him to learn whether the somewhat vague
fears he expressed then have any relevance to this accident and, if so,
whether subsequent field experience has shown the fears to have been
well-founded or groundless. The jury that hears the case, if one is
brought, certainly would hear expert testimony on that point.
B could file a similar action against our client C, but B had a
0.08% blood alcohol level. If that was the basis of a blood alcohol
charge, B's insurer could refuse to pay for the damage B caused to
20. See CONFUCIUS, CONFICIAN ANALECTS, THE GREAT LEARNING, AND THE DOC-
TRINE OF THE MEAN, BK XII, ch. XIII (Dover ed. 1971). The Master said, "In hearing
lawsuits I am like any other body. What is necessary, however, is to cause the people to have
no litigations." Id.
21. Today's statute is the successor to legislation that was first effective in 1974: "[w]here
any person suffers personal injury by accident in New Zealand... no proceedings for damages
arising directly or indirectly out of the injury . . . shall be brought in any court." Accident
Compensation Act, 1982, N.Z. Stat. 27.
22. Id. §§ 72-77. Any claim of the private insurer, D., would not be recoverable against
C. Id. § 27(1).
23. E.g., Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills Ltd. 1936 A.C. 85.
24. See supra note 19.
25. Id.
26. E.g., Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance of N.Z. Ltd. v. Stuart 1985 N.Z.L.R. 596.
27. See supra note 19.
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A's car. However, that would not affect C. B's property damage case
against C could proceed on the same legal basis as A's case: that C's
negligence in manufacture caused the accident. However, if the jury
were to find B negligent, that would reduce his damages in proportion
to his assessed fault.
28
The extent of C's risk, and thus that of E insurance company, is
at most the value of A's and B's cars, together with assessed costs and
disbursements. If each car was nearly new, the total typically would
not exceed $70,000(N.Z.). 29
On a question of incidental interest, drunken driving, B was in-
deed fortunate. His blood alcohol level of 0.08% was at the highest
level possible that would not involve New Zealand's criminal penal-
ties. 30 If his blood alcohol level had been higher than 0.08%, B would
have lost his driver's license for at least the mandatory minimum of
six months. 31  In addition, he could have been fined up to
$1,500(N.Z.) 32 and even imprisoned for up to three months. 33
The failure of A and B to wear seat belts likely resulted in the
imposition of fines, though only in the amount of $25(N.Z.). 34 New
Zealand adopted a seat, or safety, belt usage law in 1972. 35 It was the
second nation in the world to do So. 36
B. Sweden 
37
1. Personal Injury
In the unlikely event that A attempts to bring a personal injury
case against C corporation, C will have no ultimate loss. For a
number of years now, every Swedish motor vehicle owner has been
28. See supra note 19.
29. The value of this amount in U.S. dollars, at the exchange rate $1(N.Z.): $.66(U.S.), is
$46,200(U.S.).
30. Transportation Act, 1962, N.Z. Stat. §§ 30, 58.
31. Id.
32. The value of this amount in U.S. dollars, at the exchange rate $1(N.Z.): $.66(U.S.), is
$990(U.S.).
33. See supra note 30.
34. Id.
35. Traffic Regulations, 1976, S.R. 30B (2); Transportation Act, 1962, N.Z. Stat. Second
Sched., Pt. 3; see also NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATON U.S. DEP'T
OF TRANSPORTATION, EFFECTIVENESS OF SAFETY BELT USE LAWS 20 (1986) (report of T.
Vaaje) [hereinafter EFFECTIVENESS].
36. EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 35, at 13-14.
37. The author relied upon the assistance of Carl Swartling Advokatbyri, Stockholm, for
the interpretation of Swedish law.
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required to have a traffic insurance policy.38 The costs resulting from
A's personal injuries will be fully paid by Sweden's mandatory social
security insurance program and by the traffic insurance policy that
covers A's car.
39
Because A can readily collect from his own traffic insurer, A
would have no reason to sue C company. Even if A sued and won,
however, C would be entitled to full reimbursement by A's traffic in-
surer.40 There is a technical exception apparently irrelevant here: if C
company were found grossly negligent, it could not have reimburse-
ment.41 However, there is no evidence of that in this case.
B might be financially motivated to sue C on the ground that
some defect in A's car, manufactured and sold by C, caused the acci-
dent and thus B's injuries. This is especially likely because B's 0.08%
blood alcohol level means he will probably be unable to recover from
his own traffic insurance policy. 42 However, his blood alcohol level
also will prevent his recovery against C by reason of the Swedish Tort
Liability Act of 1972. 43
2. Property Damage
In Sweden, the damage to A's car is payable not by A's traffic
insurer, but rather by B 's, but only if B's fault or a defect in B's car
caused the collision.44 Since B (at 0.08%) had well over the minimum
0.05% blood alcohol level that constitutes drunken driving under
Swedish law,45 B will very likely be found at fault. If he is not, of
course, A would receive nothing from B's insurer, and then A might
seem motivated to sue C for the property damage, alleging that some
defect in the car caused the collision and thus the damage to it. How-
ever, in Sweden, damage to the product itself (i.e., A's automobile)
would not be recoverable under any product liability theory. 46
38. Swedish Traffic Damage Act of 1975, § 2. There are technical exceptions not rele-
vant here, such as those for vehicles that cannot be used in traffic.
39. Id. § 10; Swedish National Insurance Act, 1962. A's medical and other costs relating
to his personal injuries would not be payable by his traffic insurer if A was guilty of willful
misconduct, grossly negligent or simply negligent while drunk (0.05% blood alcohol or more).
There is no evidence of that here, however.
40. See supra note 37.
41. Id.
42. B is likely to be found to have been negligent while drunk, and that defeats recovery.
43. Swedish Tort Liability Act, 1972, ch. 6, § 1.
44. Swedish Traffic Damage Act, 1975, § 10.
45. Swedish Traffic Crime Act, 1951, § 4.
46. See Report, Products Liability Committee (SOU 1979:79), at 27-35; Report, Con-
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Again, B must be considered. The damage to his car is payable
by A's traffic insurer if a defect in A's car caused the crash. 47 If B
proves that claim and A's traffic insurer pays, that insurer might con-
sider seeking reimbursement from C company. However, C will be
liable only if A's traffic insurer shows C to have been grossly negli-
gent. 48 That seems extremely unlikely here. Therefore, C faces virtu-
ally no financial risk.
As to the questions of incidental interest, B likely faced a crimi-
nal trial with a mandatory one month period of incarceration upon
conviction, as well as suspension of his driving privileges, because of
his 0.08% blood alcohol level. 49 The failure of A and B to wear seat
belts likely resulted in the imposition of fines. 50
C Australia51
As will be shown below, A can sue C company in most Austra-
lian jurisdictions, and his cause of action is likely to resemble the one
that would be filed in a number of other common law countries.
1. Negligence
To make out a negligence action against C, A must show, pursu-
ant to traditional common law principles, that it was C company's
duty to use reasonable care in the manufacture and design of A's car,
that C breached that duty and that C's failure to exercise reasonable
care caused A's injury.52
One cannot know whether A will contend that it was the tran-
saxle that caused the accident. However, if A alleges that C breached
its duty of care by making a defective transaxle, then the engineer's
report will be discoverable.5 3 A may be expected to call expert wit-
sumer Sales Act Committee (SOU 1984:25), at 186-98, and Supreme Court cases cited therein.
The vehicle, and not merely some part of the vehicle, would be considered the product.
47. Supra note 37.
48. Swedish Traffic Damage Act, 1975, § 20.
49. Swedish Traffic Crime Act, 1951, § 4; Swedish Driver's Licenses Act, 1977, § 16.
The sanctions can vary, however, and B could upon conviction be ordered to pay a criminal
fine, or he could be incarcerated for a longer period of time-up to six months.
50. Swedish Road Traffic Ordinance, 1972, §§ 117a, 164; see EFFECTIVENESS, supra note
35, at 20. Sweden has had a seat belt usage law since 1975. Id.
51. The author relied upon the assistance of Mallesons Stephens Jacques, Melbourne, for
the interpretation of Australian law.
52. See, e.g., Donoghue v. Stevenson, 1932 A.C. 562, 580.
53. See, e.g., Rockwell Machine Tool Co. v. F. P. Barrus (Concessionaires) Ltd. and Ors.,
2 All E.R. 98, 99 (1968).
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nesses and C company personnel. The claim may be that the tran-
saxle was defectively designed, manufactured or assembled.
In Australia, the court, in determining whether C breached its
duty of care, will consider:
(1) the likelihood of the risk materializing;
(2) the likely seriousness of its consequences if it did;
(3) the cost of guarding against the risk; and
(4) the social utility of C company's activity (i.e., manufacturing
automobiles).
54
To determine the final element of causation, an Australian judge
will employ the traditional common law sine qua non or "but for"
test.5 5 Here, investigation of all the accident circumstances will be
imperative for the insurer of C. The transaxle may not have been
defective at all but simply may have broken in the midst of the violent
collision. Negligent driving by A or B, or both, may have been the
cause of the crash. B's alcohol level may well indicate that he was
negligent in his driving; an investigation should show whether he was.
A's failure to wear his safety belt, if that failure enhanced his injuries,
may amount to contributory negligence, thus defeating recovery.56
If A alleges a defect in the transaxle, then the insurer would need
to learn whether C made the transaxle or purchased it from an outside
entity. If it was the latter, a judge could reasonably determine that
even though C did not make this component, C knew or should have
known of a defect in it and yet failed to take reasonable steps to avoid
the consequences, such as warning customers or conducting a recall
campaign. If those facts are proven, the court can hold C liable even
though it did not make the transaxle. 57
2. Deceit
This claim, if made by A, would be based upon the express war-
ranty that C gave A, upon the initial sale of the car to A. One would
therefore review the terms of that warranty. A would be required to
show that C or its agent made a knowingly false representation of fact
with the intention that A or people similarly situated would act on it
54. See, e.g., Bolton v. Stone, [1951] A.C. 850; Paris v. Stepney Borough Council, [1951]
A.C. 367; Watt v. Hertfordshire County Council, 2 All E.R. 368 (1954).
55. See, e.g., Cork v. Kirby MacLean Ltd., 2 All E.R. 402, 407 (1952).
56. See supra note 51.
57. See, e.g., Watson v. Buckley, 1 All E.R. 174 (1940); Clarke v. Army & Navy Coop.
Soc'y Ltd., [1903] 1 K.B. 155.
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to their detriment, and that in fact A did so act.58 On the facts, this
claim seems at most a remote possibility.
C's insurer would want to learn where in Australia this accident
occurred, so that it might have a better idea where A might try to
bring an action against C.
3. Certain Statutory Limits on Tort Claims
The Northern Territory has an accident compensation system
quite similar to the one in effect in New Zealand.5 9 A would be unable
to sue C or anyone else if A is a resident of the Territory and the
accident occurred there. 6° Rather, A would receive compensation
under the Northern Territory statutory scheme.
6'
C also may be effectively immune from liability if the State of
Tasmania proves to have been involved in certain ways. These are:
(1) A was a resident of Tasmania and the accident occurred there;
(2) A was a resident of Tasmania and the car he was driving was
registered there (regardless of where in Australia the accident oc-
curred); or
(3) The accident occurred in Tasmania and the car A was driving
was registered there (regardless of A's residency).
62
If one of those fact situations existed, A doubtless would have
received the prescribed benefits from the Tasmania Motor Accidents
Insurance Board.63 Unlike the situation in the Northern Territory, A
could nevertheless sue C in a Tasmanian court, but because double
recovery is prohibited,64 C's (and therefore E's) financial risk obvi-
ously would be minimal.
If the accident occurred in the State of Victoria, one would need
to consider the likely effect of new legislation there. 65 Under this leg-
islation, A, a person injured in a "transport accident, ' 66 is entitled to
benefits, including loss of earnings, medical and associated expenses
58. See, e.g., Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. D. 459 (1885).
59. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
60. Motor Accidents Compensation Act, 1979, N. Terr. Austl. Ord., § 5. "[N]o action
for damages shall lie in the Territory in respect of the death of or injury to a resident of the
Territory in or as a result of an accident that occurred in the Territory." Id.
61. Id.
62. Motor Accidents (Liabilities and Compensation) Act, 1973, TAS. SESs. STAT., part
IV.
63. Id. § 23 (1).
64. Id. § 27.
65. Transport Accident Act, 1986, Vict. Stat., R. Regs. & B.
66. Id § 35(1).
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and a lump sum for bodily impairment. 67
In the subject accident, A's right leg was crushed and he suffered
other serious orthopedic injuries for which he was hospitalized several
weeks. One therefore would need to consider whether A would likely
be found thirty percent or more disabled under the Act. 68 If, upon
assessment he is,69 then he would have a "serious injury" and may sue
C (and others) in spite of the Act.70 However, he may recover pecuni-
ary losses only up to a maximum of $450,000(Austl.) 71 and "pain and
suffering" damages only to a maximum of $200,000(Austl.).
72
Thus, if the accident occurred in Victoria, C's maximum expo-
sure would be $650,000(Austl.), 73 together with interest from the acci-
dent to the date of the award. 74 And, if A did obtain judgment against
C, he would be ordered to repay to the Transport Accident Commis-
sion compensation payments he had already received. 75 In the case at
hand, the financial risk does not seem nearly so large as
$650,000(Austl.).
4. Contract
A could bring an action against C in contract. A contract action
may be brought under the Trade Practices Act of 1974, on the ground
that a causative defect in the car rendered it not of merchantable qual-
ity,76 but that would be unusual in an Australian personal injury
case.77
5. Damages
In any event, the ultimate financial risk to C and thus to its in-
surer, E, for property damage and personal injury to A appears to be
about $150,000(Austl.).
78
67. Supra note 65.
68. Id. § 47.
69. Id.
70. Id. § 93 (2), (3).
71. Id. § 93 (7).
72. Id.
73. The value of this amount in U.S. dollars, at the exchange rate $1(Austl.): S.75(U.S.),
is $487,500(U.S.).
74. Transport Accident Act, 1986, Vict. Stat., R. Regs. & B, § 93 (15).
75. Id. § 93 (11).
76. See, e.g., Cehave NV v. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft mbl, [1976] 1 QB 44.
77. See supra note 51.
78. The value of this amount in U.S. dollars, at the exchange rate $1(Austl.): $.75(U.S.),
is $112,500(U.S.).
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6. Incidental Interest
As to the questions of incidental interest, B may have been
charged criminally because of his 0.08% blood alcohol level. 79 We
have seen that A's failure to wear a seat belt may amount to contribu-
tory negligence and thus wholly defeat recovery. In addition, the fail-
ure of A and B to wear seat belts probably resulted in the imposition
of fines. 80 The State of Victoria was the first jurisdiction in the world
to adopt safety belt usage laws.81 These laws have been in effect since
December, 1970.82 The other Australian jurisdictions followed suit
during the next two years.8 3 The police are noted for their vigorous
enforcement of safety belt usage laws, 4 and in parts of the country,
usage rates have exceeded ninety percent.8 5  In Victoria and the
Northern Territory, unpaid fines imposed for failure to wear seat belts
can mean a jail sentence. 86
D. Japan 87
A could sue C company. C, upon learning of the claim, is likely
to seek a compromise settlement with A, and A is likely to make the
necessary concessions to ensure that. In addition to the general ten-
dency of the Japanese to seek compromise, C's concern for the preser-
vation of its reputation and A's likely concern over the expense, time
and difficulty involved in a lawsuit against C will be powerful incen-
tives toward early settlement. Indeed, there appear to be few Japa-
nese case law precedents for a lawsuit by A against C.88 Although
theoretically, A may sue in tort and possibly also in contract, only a
few product liability lawsuits are filed, and ninety-nine percent are
79. In every Australian jurisdiction except one, a blood alcohol level of 0.08% while
driving constitutes a criminal offense. The one exception is the Capital Territory, where it is
an offense to drive with a blood alcohol level greater than 0.08%. Motor Traffic (Alcohol and
Drugs) Ordinance, 1977, Austl. Cap. Terr. Ord. § 19.
80. See EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 35, at 20.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 3 (conference comments of P. Milne). "[T]he Australian experience has relied
upon consistent enforcement, with tickets issued for failure to comply with belt use laws being
second in number only to speeding tickets." Id.
85. Id. at 12.
86. Id. at 15.
87. The author relied upon the assistance of Aoki, Christensen & Nomoto, Tokyo, for the
interpretation of Japanese law.
88. Id.
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settled. 89
A's tort action could be a claim for damages on the ground of an
unlawful act.90 To prevail, he must prove that C was negligent in that
it manufactured a defective automobile. A is not likely to win such a
case, as a practical matter, because of difficulty in proving C's
negligence.
The contractual claim would be that an implied contract arose at
the time of sale, and that because the car was defective in some causal
way, C failed to perform its contractual obligation.91 There is no re-
ported case, however, in which a new car purchaser injured in a colli-
sion successfully used this provision in a lawsuit against the
manufacturer.
In the unlikely event that A were to bring a lawsuit against C and
prevail, the court would determine A's damage award by referring to
a published schedule promulgated by the Bar Association, the Auto-
mobile Liability Indemnity Law Enforcement Regulations or gener-
ally-accepted insurance company payment schedules.92 For the
purpose of this risk analysis, the most generous schedule, that of the
Bar Association, shall be used.
On the basis of the most extreme factual assumptions, 93the finan-
cial risk to C could be about 75.4 million yen.94 A's private insurer,
D, will be subrogated to A's rights to the extent of its payments to A,
and A will not be able to recover that amount because double recovery
is prohibited.95 This outside exposure estimate of 75.4 million yen
includes the regulated fee for A's lawyer, which in the case of the
assumed total victory for A, would include both an initiation fee and a
success fee, 96 for a total fee of about 6,627,520 yen.97 A would have
89. Id.
90. Minpo (Civil Code), Law no. 11 of 1898, art. 709. For meaning of the term "unlaw-
ful" act, see explanation thereof. Id.
91. Id. art. 415.
92. See supra note 87.
93. The assumptions are that A's medical and related expenses were 3 million yen; his
annual income was 4.2 million yen, his right leg injury was 7th grade on the Labor Standard
Bureau's table; he was hospitalized for three months, absent from work four months, and has
residual nerve dysfunction; further, his automobile repair cost was 700,000 yen.
94. The value of this amount in U.S. dollars, at the exchange rate l(Jap.): S.0075(U.S.), is
about $565,500(U.S.).
95. See supra note 87.
96. Id.
97. The value of this amount in U.S. dollars at the exchange rate l(Jap.): $.0075(U.S.), is
about $49,706(U.S.).
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no right to make a "punitive" or "exemplary" damage claim.98
We have proceeded thus far upon the assumption that the judge
would find no fault whatever on the part of B. But B had a 0.08%
blood alcohol level, and thus B may well have been at least partially
responsible, even if a defect in A's car also was a cause of his injuries.
In addition, A's damages may be reduced because of his failure to
wear a safety belt.
Suppose the judge finds that C company was sixty percent at
fault and B was forty percent at fault, which is something a Japanese
judge may do.99 C would be liable to pay only sixty percent of the
75.4 million yen assumed, or 45.24 million yen.' °° B would pay the
remainder if he were able to do so. 10' If not, C must pay it all, pursu-
ant to the Japanese equivalent of the joint and several liability doc-
trine. 0 2 However, E, C's insurer, would be legally required to
reimburse C only the sixty percent, the amount imposed in the first
instance by the court. 0 3 C company would itself bear the burden of
the remaining forty percent (B's share that B could not pay). Any
percentage fault attributable to plaintiff A would result in a propor-
tionate decrease in his damage award.' °4
As to the questions of incidental interest, B likely faced a jail
sentence of up to three months and a fine of up to 30,000 yen because
of his 0.08% blood alcohol level.' 0 5 In addition, depending upon his
driving record, B could have had his license revoked or suspended for
up to six months. 0 6
The failure of A and B to wear seat belts likely resulted in the
imposition of an administrative point penalty against each.1
°7
98. See supra note 87.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Road Traffic Law, art. 65, 1 (7)-2 1970, Cabinet Order No. 226 (Jap.); Road Traffic
Law Enforcement Regulations, art. 44-3, 1970, Cabinet Order No. 227 (Jap.). The value of
30,000 yen in U.S. dollars, at the exchange rate 1(Jap.): $.0075(U.S.), is $225(U.S.). In Japan,
the legal blood alcohol limit is 0.05%. Id.
106. Road Traffic Law, art. 90, 3 1970, Cabinet Order No. 226 (Jap.); Road Traffic Law
Enforcement Regulations, art. 33-3, 1 1970, Cabinet Order No. 227 (Jap.).
107. Road Traffic Law, art. 71-2, 1985, Cabinet Order No. 218 (Jap.); Road Traffic Law
Enforcement Regulations, art. 33-3, 1, scheds. 1, 2, 1970, Cabinet Order No. 227 (Jap.).
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E. Belgium 1°8
Even under present, pre-Directive Belgian law, A could sue C
company in both tort and contract. 109
A's tort theory would be that his car had some hidden defect that
caused his injuries."I0 His theory in contract would be that the defect
made it impossible for the car to be used in the way that an ordinary
purchaser would contemplate. II
Further evaluation of this lawsuit, if filed, must await further in-
vestigation of the accident facts. In Belgium, a serious traffic accident
like this one would have to be investigated by the police. Indeed, the
police are likely to appoint an expert to assist in the investigation.
The criminal investigation report is available to the parties.'1 2 If A
sues C, C's insurer would likewise be able to review this report. 113
Even if A can show only that his car was defective-without
showing the defect caused his injuries in this collision-he will be en-
titled to an order that cancels the sale and reimburses him for the
purchase price of the car.' 14
For C to be required to pay for A's personal injuries, A must
convince the judge that, under the Belgian interpretation of the civil
law's "theory of equivalence of conditions,"' 15 every accident circum-
stance without which the damages would not have occurred as they
did occur was a cause of the damages, 16 and such a circumstance
necessarily would be the defective condition of A's car.
A will be entitled to see C's records and thus the report written
by the engineer.' 17 At the trial, A will probably request expert testi-
mony. The expert can be appointed by the court or the investigating
police officer." 8 The expert, if he finds that the defect was in the tran-
saxle, may be expected to use C's engineer's report to support his
108. The author relied upon the assistance of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton,
Brussels, for the interpretation of Belgian law.
109. See infra notes 110-11.
110. Judgment of Dec. 12, 1958, Cass., Pass., 1959, I, 383.
111. CODE CIVIL [C.Civ.] arts. 1615,1641 (1804) (Belg.); see also 4 H. DE PAGE, TRAITt
DE DROIT CIVIL, 146 and 186 (1972).
112. See supra note 108.
113. Id.
114. C. Civ., arts. 1615, 1641 (1804) (Belg.).
115. See 4 H. DE PAGE, TRAITf DE DROIT CIVIL, 955-64 (1972); 2 R. DALCQ, TRAITf_ DE
LA RESPONSABILITIE CIVILE, 2553-62 (1962).
116. Id.
117. See supra note 108.
118. Id.
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testimony. A can, of course, sue B as well, and B's blood alcohol level
of 0.08% makes this especially likely.
The judge who hears the case may assign percentages of responsi-
bility to A, B and C company. A's recovery of money will be reduced
directly by any percentage of responsibility assigned to him. 19 If B
and C each are assigned responsibility, A may collect the entire
amount from either-that is, the rule of joint and several liability
(responsabiliti n solidum) generally applies in Belgium. 120 Of course,
if C were thus required to pay more than its assigned share, it could
recover the excess from B. 121 Since all drivers in Belgium are required
to have insurance, 122 it is very likely that C would be able to make
such a recovery.
The amount that a judge could award to A would include recov-
ery for his medical expenses, his "moral damages" for suffering dur-
ing the accident, in the hospital and thereafter, his temporary or
permanent disability, and the damage to his vehicle. 123 While the
amount a judge may award is not predictable with precision, in a case
such as this, one might expect an award of no more than 9 million
(Belg.) 124 and probably less. The other interested insurers, such as D,
would be entitled to make indemnification claims, but A could not
have a double recovery. 125
Belgium is regarded as one of the most favorable European juris-
dictions for consumer lawsuits such as this one. Thus, the new EEC
Directive will not significantly improve the rights of the consumer,
except in regard to certain questions relating to applicable periods of
limitations.
As to the questions of incidental interest, because of his 0.08%
blood alcohol level, B is likely to face imprisonment of 15 to 90 days
and a fine of 600 to 6,000 (Belg.). 26 In addition, a court could with-
119. Judgment of May 23, 1979, Cass., Pas., 1979, I, 1103.
120. See 4 H. DE PAGE, TRAITIf DE DROIT CIVIL, 1032 (1972); see also J. FAGNART & M.
DENEVE, LA RESPONSABILITf CIVILE (1976-1984), 27 (1985).
121. 4 H. DE PAGE, TRAITf DE DROIT CIVIL, 1032 (1972).
122. Law of July 1, 1956, regarding mandatory third party liability insurance in respect of
motor vehicles, [v6hicules automoteurs assurance obligatoire (L.), II 623], art. 2.
123. See supra note 108.
124. The value of this amount in U.S. dollars, at the exchange rate l(Belg.): S.029(U.S.), is
about $261,000(U.S.).
125. 4 H. DE PAGE, TRAITf DE DROrr CIVIL, 1033 (1972).
126. The value of these amounts in U.S. dollars, at the exchange rate l(Belg.): $0.29(U.S.),
is from about $17(U.S.) to about $174(U.S.).
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draw B's driving privileges for eight days to five years. 127 The failure
of A or B to wear seat belts could have resulted in imprisonment from
one day to one month, as well as a fine. 128
F. France 1
29
A could file a civil action against C company, even under pre-
Directive French law, so long as he does so within a short period of
time (bref dlai).130 A may sue either in tort or in contract, but not
both. 13 1 However, his proof requirements will be similar under either
theory. The essential basis for the action would be that the car con-
tained a hidden defect (vice cachd) 132 which caused A's injuries.
Under the forthcoming Directive legislation, A's theory would be that
the car did not provide the safety which a person is entitled to
expect.1
33
A will be able to sue for all of his damages, including unforesee-
able damages, property damage and business and emotional harm.
Before trial, it is highly unlikely that A will obtain the engineer's
statement, for there is in France no evidentiary process that would be
likely to result in the document's production. An expert appointed by
the court would be likely to testify at the trial. If that expert finds
that A's car was defective and that the defect caused A's injuries, the
judge would likely find C liable, even if C shows that it could not in
fact have discovered the defect, because the manufacturer is presumed
to know of all hidden defects.13 4
A can sue B as well. The judge may not, however, directly assign
percentages of responsibility for the accident. Rather, if C is held lia-
ble for the entire judgment, it can seek contribution from B; at that
127. Law regarding the road traffic coordinated by Royal Decree of March 16, 1968, [Po-
lice de la circulation routi6re (A.R.)] arts. 34 & 38 (BeIg.).
128. Id. art. 29; see also EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 35, at 20. Belgium has had a seat belt
usage law since 1975. Id.
129. The author relied upon the assistance of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, Paris,
for the interpretation of French law.
130. CODE CIVIL [C. Civ.] art. 1648 (1804) (Fr.). If the action is purely for breach of
contract under art. 1146, however, the brefdilai limitation would not apply to this case.
131. C. Civ. arts. 1146 & 1641 (1804).
132. Id.
133. Directive, supra note 12, art. 6.1.
134. C. Civ. art. 1643 (1804); Judgment of Jan. 19, 1965, Cass. civ. Ire, Fr., 1965 Recueil
Dalloz [D.S. Jur.] 389; Judgment of Oct. 18, 1977, Cass. civ. 3e, Fr., 1977 Bulletin des Arrets
de la Cour de Cassation, Chambres Civiles [Bull. Civ. III] 347; Judgment of Feb. 25, 1981,
Cass. com., Fr., 1981 Bullitin des Arrets de la Cour de Cassation, Chambres Civiles [Bull. Civ.
IV], 311; Judgment of May 3, 1983, Cass. com., Fr., 1983 Bull. Civ. IV 131.
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point, relative degrees of fault would be determined. 135 If B cannot
pay, however, C will bear the entire burden, for the rule of joint and
several liability (responsabilitd in solidum)136 will apply. The Direc-
tive, too, provides for joint and several liability. 137 However, any fault
on A's part would be determined on a percentage basis by the judge
and would directly reduce A's recovery. 138 That fault could include
A's failure to wear his seat belt.139
The damage award is within the discretion of the judge and the
amount cannot be predicted exactly. 14° However, an award of more
than 1 million francs seems unlikely. 141 Even under the Directive leg-
islation, the calculation of damages will continue to be done by
French courts.142 If the insurer's policy with C includes a clause ex-
cepting liability in a design defect case, the insurer would be permit-
ted to assert that in a French court. 143
As to the questions of incidental interest, B would face imprison-
ment of up to one year and a fine of 500 to 20,000 (Fr.)' 44 because of
his 0.08% blood alcohol level. 145 However, the victim's harm is rele-
vant in French criminal law: if A's disability exceeded three months,
the sanctions imposed against B would be doubled.146 The failure of
A and B to wear safety belts could have resulted in the imposition of a
fine of 230 (Fr.) against each. 147
G. Federal Republic of Germany 1
48
A can sue C in a West German court. 149 He may be expected to
135. See supra note 129.
136. Id.
137. See Directive, supra note 12, art. 3(3).
138. Id. 10,706.
139. Judgment of Oct. 3, 1979, Cass. crim., Fr., 1980 D.S. Jur., 128; Judgment of Mar. 16,
1977, Cass. crim., Fr., 1977, D.S. Jur., 469.
140. See supra note 129.
141. Id. The value of this amount in U.S. dollars, at the exchange rate l(Fr.): $.175(U.S.),
is $175,000(U.S.).
142. See Directive, supra note 12, 10,706.
143. Supra note 129.
144. The value of these amounts in U.S. dollars, at the exchange rate l(Fr.): $.175(U.S.), is
$87.50(U.S.) to $3,500(U.S.).
145. CODE PtNAL [C. PEN.] art. 320 (1977) (Fr.).
146. Id.
147. CODE DE PROCfDURE PtNAL [C. PR. PEN.] art. R 49 (1986) (Fr.); France has had a
seat belt usage law sine 1973. See supra note 129.
148. The author relied upon the assistance of Boden, Oppenhoff & Schneider, K61n, for
the interpretation of German law.
149. Id.
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allege that a defect in his car caused his injuries. A may also sue B.
In practice, A will have been indemnified for medical and related
costs by reason of the extensive social security programs in the Fed-
eral Republic.150 Thus, lawsuits against C could be brought by vari-
ous insurers and social security agencies that are subrogated to A's
rights, as well as by A himself. 51
A successful pre-Directive action against C must include proof
that C was at fault. However, even after implementation, if there was
indeed a causative defect, but C can show that under the state of re-
search and technology at the time A's car was made, C could not have
recognized the defect, C will be exonerated.
152
The likely basis for an action against C is a case sounding in tort
and founded upon a specific statute.15 3 At the trial, C as a practical
matter will bear the burden of showing that it was not at fault for A's
injury. 5 4 C today is free to prove that, even if the defect could have
been detected, it carefully selected and supervised all those responsi-
ble for the product's design and manufacture and used adequate qual-
ity control procedures. 55 This will not be an available defense after
implementation of the Directive.
56
The amount that a pre-Directive judge might award to A (and his
subrogees) could include medical expenses, present loss of income, fu-
ture loss of income' 57 and damages for pain and suffering, as well as
property damage. 58 Under the Directive, claims will be for pecuni-
ary damages, not pain and suffering and the like. 5 9 A's own fault, by
reason of his own negligence, can diminish or even wholly defeat re-
covery, 6 0 before and after the Directive. A's negligence certainly
could include his failure to wear a safety belt so long as that failure
contributed to his injuries.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See supra note 148. After the Directive is implemented, a manufacturer in the Fed-
eral Republic will not be held liable if it is able to prove that under the state of research and
technology at the time the product was introduced into commerce, the defect could not have
been detected. Directive, supra note 12, art. 7(e).
153. BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] § 823 (1900) (W. Ger.).
154. See supra note 148.
155. Id.
156. See Directive, supra note 12, art. 7(a)-(d).
157. BGB § 843 (1900) (W. Ger.).
158. Id. § 847.
159. See Directive, supra note 12, art. 9.
160. BGB § 254 (1900) (W. Ger.).
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While it is impossible to state with precision the amount that a
judge would award, an award of more than 200,000(W. Ger.) 161 and a
monthly pension of 800(W. Ger.) per month 162 seems unlikely given
the presumed injury, assuming normal medical costs and losses of in-
come for such an injury.
As to the questions of incidental interest, B's 0.08% blood alco-
hol level constituted a criminal offense. 163 The fine imposed could
have been as much as 3,000 (W. Ger.). 164 In addition, B may have
been prevented from driving for up to three months by reason of his
0.08% blood alcohol level. 165
In addition, however, B could have been convicted under the Pe-
nal Code if his intoxication contributed to the accident and A's inju-
ries.166 His punishment could have included a fine of forty-five to
sixty day's income and cancellation of his driving privileges for per-
haps nine months. 16
7
The failure of A and B to wear seat belts constituted an offense 168
and likely resulted in the imposition of fines. 169 The fine for each
could have been as high as 1,000(W. Ger.). 170
H. England 171
A can file a lawsuit against C company. 172 The action will not lie
in contract, 173 for A and C are not in privity, A having purchased the
car from a dealer. 174 The likely action against C would sound in tort
161. The value of this amount in U.S. dollars, at the exchange rate l(W. Ger.): $.60(U.S.),
is $120,000(U.S.).
162. At the exchange rate I(W. Ger.): $.60(U.S.), this would equal $480(U.S.) per month.
163. Road Traffic Act, § 24a Strassenverkehrsgesetz [STVG] (1973) (W. Ger.).
164. Id. At the exchange rate DM I(W. Ger.): $.60(U.S.), this would equal $1,800(U.S.).
165. Id.
166. Penal Code § 230 Strafgesetzbuch [STGB] (1970) (negligent infliction of injuries) and
§ 315c STGB (1970) (negligently endangering road traffic) (W. Ger.).
167. Id.
168. Road Traffic Act, § 21a Strassenverkehrsordnung [STVO] (1985) (W. Ger.).
169. Road Traffic Act, § 24a STVG (1973) (W. Ger.); see also EFFECTIVENESS, supra note
35, at 20. The Federal Republic of Germany has had a seat belt usage law since 1976. See
supra note 148.
170. At the exchange rate I(W. Ger.): $.60(W. Ger.), this would equal $600(U.S.).
171. The author relied upon the assistance of Slaughter and May, London, for the
interpretation of English law.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Should A sue the selling dealer in contract, of course, C could be sued in contract by
the dealer seeking indemnification.
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(negligence).175 A will seek to show that C was negligent because
there was a causative defect in the car.
C would have a valid defense if it could show that under the state
of knowledge at the time it manufactured A's car, the causative de-
fect, even if there was one, could not reasonably have been discov-
ered. 1 76 The defenses of contributory negligence and voluntary
assumption of risk theoretically exist, but neither appears likely to be
useful in the accident situation as described.
In the action, A will seek damages for his physical injury and
economic losses arising directly from it. Damages are intended to
compensate A for his pain and suffering, property damages, lost earn-
ings and further additional expenses.
1 77
The judge, in his discretion, can order an unsuccessful party to
pay some or all of the solicitors, barristers and adverse parties' costs
and fees and other litigation costs. 1 78 In practice, certain costs will be
disallowed, so that the losing party and its insurers may expect to pay
between half and three-fourths of the costs of the other side.179 Obvi-
ously, the losing party would in addition bear its own costs.
Contingency fees are not permitted. °8 0 As a matter of profes-
sional conduct, lawyers in the United Kingdom do not accept contin-
gency fees because they are considered to produce the effect of an
illegal bargain similar to champerty (lawyers would obtain a share of
the proceeds for assisting a party in a lawsuit).
The United Kingdom adopted the EEC Directive in the 1987
Consumer Protection Act.' 8 ' Under it, strict liability applies.
8 2
Thus, in the situation given, A would seek to show only that his car
was defective because its degree of safety was "not such as persons
generally are entitled to expect."'' 8 3 Other than that proof require-
ment, the risk C faces will not be significantly different under the new
Act.' 8 4 The state of the art defense is retained.85
175. See, e.g., Vacwell Eng'g Co. v. B.D.H. Chems. Ltd. [1971] 1 QB 88.
176. See supra note 171.
177. Id.
178. See Rules of the Supreme Court, Order 62, Rule 3 (High Court actions).
179. See supra note 171.
180. Id.
181. Consumer Protection Act, 1987.
182. Id.
183. The Consumer Protection Act, 1987, § 3. But cf Directive, supra note 12, art. 6.1.
184. See supra note 171.
185. There is a defense if "the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the relevant
time was not such that a producer of products of the same description as the product in ques-
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Before trial, C will be compelled to disclose its relevant docu-
ments, and the engineer's report may well be produced. It does not
conclusively prove negligence or liability, of course, but obviously it
could be damaging to C if it is left unexplained. At the trial, various
experts proffered by the parties will testify before the judge.
If the evidence is that A's leg injury was so severe as to require
amputation, with obvious continuing disability therefrom, an award
of between £30,000 and £40,000 seems likely.1 86 The award could be
higher if A requires continued future nursing care and if his future
earning capacity is affected. In addition to that, special damages
would be awarded by the judge for quantifiable damages, such as the
damage to A's car, his medical expenses and actual loss of earnings. 18 7
Thus, for a total compensatory figure, one may presume as an upper
limit the amount of £60,000.188
An award of exemplary or punitive damages is unlikely. There is
no authority that would suggest that such an award would be made in
this case. When such awards are made, they are moderate in
amount. 189
On the first question of incidental interest, drunken driving, B
was as fortunate as his counterpart in New Zealand. His blood alco-
hol level of 0.08% was the highest level that would not invoke Eng-
land's criminal penalties. 90 The failure of A and B to wear safety
belts was a criminal offense.' 91 In addition, A's damages would be
reduced for his negligence if the evidence shows that his injuries were
enhanced by the failure to wear his seat belt.192
III. REFLECTIONS ON FOREIGN LAW
At this point, the following is what has been observed in the first
eight of these advanced industrial nations.
One observes that judges seem to decide product liability dis-
putes, with the exception of property damage cases in New Zealand.
tion might be expected to have discovered the defect in it if it had existed in his products while
they were under his control." The Consumer Protection Act, 1987, § 4 (1) (e).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. The value of this amount in U.S. dollars, at the exchange rate £1: $1.85(U.S.), is
$111,000(U.s.).
189. See supra note 171.
190. Transport Act, 1981, § 25 (3), sched. 8.
191. Road Traffic Act, 1972, § 33(A); Transport Act, 1981, § 27; Motor Vehicles (Wear-
ing of Seatbelt) Regulations, 1982.
192. See supra note 171.
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Judges determine damages. On the hypothetical case facts, the in-
surer of C in each nation would face risks ranging from nothing in
Sweden to perhaps $32,500(U.S.) in New Zealand, around
$100,000(U.S.) in the other common law countries (England and
Australia), and between $150,000(U.S.) and $250,000(U.S.) at the
most in France, Belgium and the Federal Republic of Germany. In
Japan, litigation would be exceedingly unlikely, and a settlement
within the ranges just reviewed most likely. In each of the eight coun-
tries, the failure to wear safety belts would result in a penalty. B's
blood alcohol level of 0.08% would, upon conviction, result in a
mandatory jail sentence in Belgium and Sweden, a likely jail sentence
in France and Japan, and penalties everywhere else except England,
New Zealand and one Australian jurisdiction-and even there 0.08%
is the highest allowable limit. The contingent fee is nowhere to be
seen, nor are punitive damages.
IV. UNITED STATES PRODUCT-RELATED ACCIDENT CLAIMS
In the United States, the legal system is very different. Although
any U.S. jurisdiction would demonstrate the differences, let us utilize
as examples the product liability laws of two contiguous jurisdictions
in the center of the nation, Missouri and Kansas.
A. Missouri
A can sue C company. Missouri holds manufacturers "economi-
cally and socially responsible for injuries actually caused by the prod-
ucts they place for profit in the stream of commerce." 193 The lawsuit
may be brought as many as five years after the accident with no pen-
alty and no requirement that A give notice of the accident prior to the
court filing. 194
A's case may be based upon negligence, strict liability, and im-
plied warranty; indeed, it may be based upon all three. A may make
multiple, internally-inconsistent defect claims. He may postulate that
no defect caused the accident, but then assert that some defect in the
design of the car increased the injuries he otherwise would have sus-
tained in it. 195 A may claim defects in design, manufacture or assem-
193. Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371, 383 (Mo. 1986) (en banc)
(emphasis omitted).
194. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.120 (Vernon 1952).
195. This is the U.S. enhanced injury doctrine. See Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391
F.2d 495, 504 (8th Cir. 1968); Annotation, Liability of Manufacturer, Seller, or Distributor of
Motor Vehicle for Defect Which Merely Enhances Injury From Accident Otherwise Caused, 42
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bly, or simultaneously claim two or all three of them, and with respect
to as many of the vehicle's 14,000 parts as he chooses. He may allege
that a failure to warn of some danger in the use of the product renders
C liable.
A may sue B, settle with him and proceed against C. A's spouse
can join in the same lawsuit, seeking damages for the loss of A's serv-
ices. Any punitive damage claim by A against C in the amount of
many millions of U.S. dollars will be freely allowed by Missouri
courts. 1
9 6
Whatever A alleges initially is subject to change at his attorney's
election.197 Indeed, that attorney will be bound to allege particular
theories of recovery only after the conclusion of the entire trial, just
before the jury is told by the judge the applicable principles of law.198
It is that jury that will decide whether A's automobile was defective
and, if so, determine damages.
The time from the filing of the action until the trial actually be-
gins, may extend up to several years. During that time, the insurer
may expect to incur significant costs for factual investigations, partic-
ularly if A waits several years after the accident before filing his action
so that the relevant facts are stale. The insurer may also expect to
incur significant attorney fees during this extended period. If, at the
end of that frequently long period of time the attorney for A desires to
cease his prosecution of the matter, he may do so by the mere filing of
a court paper. 199 In that event, neither the insurer nor C will have
recourse against A for their accumulated costs, and A's dismissal will
have been "without prejudice," so that his attorney will be free to file
the action anew within one year and begin the process again.200
If A ultimately fails in his action, he may be assessed certain mi-
nor court costs, but in no event will A be ordered to pay C's, or C's
insurer's significant costs, including attorney fees. If A prevails, he
will-under the contingent fee system that prevails in some form in
A.L.R. 3d FED 560 (1972 & Supp. 1987). In Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d 259, 266 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976), a federal court first predicted Missouri would adopt
the doctrine. No Missouri appellate court has yet done so. However, such claims are permit-
ted routinely in Missouri trial courts.
196. Rinker v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655, 668-69 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (actions
which give rise to liability of a corporate employee may also impose punitive damages on the
corporate employer).
197. Mo. REV. STAT. § 55.33(a) (1987).
198. Id.
199. Mo. REV. STAT. § 67.01 (1987).
200. Id.
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all 50 of the U.S. states but is unheard-of or flatly illegal virtually
everywhere else in the world-be compelled to give about forty per-
cent of the recovery to his attorney. Thus, if the judgment is for $2.5
million, the lawyer's share is about $1 million.
A will, as noted earlier, contend that his car was causally defec-
tive and unreasonably dangerous. The Missouri jury will be free in its
private deliberations to define those terms as it likes.20 1 A Missouri
appeals court recently held that the "absence of a safety factor may
constitute a dangerous condition and therefore be defective, '20 2 but
did not define those terms. A Missouri jury is "free to infer that an
alternative design would have been safer and would have prevented
[the] accident, ' 20 3 but it need announce its decision only to that effect,
not what that design might be.
As in most U.S. jurisdictions, the plaintiff here will be free to
offer expert testimony of highly dubious value. 204 Thus, the jury, in-
evitably comprised of six persons with very little likelihood that any
one of them would qualify in court, even under the most lax qualifica-
tions, as an expert witness in the relevant technical disciplines, is
given very wide latitude indeed in determining liability.
It would seem that under Missouri law, virtually no defenses are
available to C, as a practical matter, if the jury determines the product
to have been causally defective. For example, neither of the follow-
ing, even if fully proven to the satisfaction of every juror, would con-
stitute a legally valid defense:
-A misused the product (so long as this misuse was reasonably
foreseeable). 2
0 5
-C designed and manufactured the car to the state of the engineering
art.
20 6
A Missouri jury may compare the fault of A, B and C and assign
201. Missouri's highest court has elected to adopt neither the EEC Directive-like "con-
sumer expectation" nor the "risk-utility" test for determining defect. See Nesselrode v. Execu-
tive Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371, 382 (Mo. 1986).
202. Baker v. International Harvester Co., 660 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
203. Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371, 382 (Mo. 1986).
204. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH. L. REV. 473 (1986).
An expert can be found to testify to the truth of almost any factual theory, no matter
how frivolous, thus validating the case sufficiently to avoid summary judgment and
force the matter to trial. At the trial itself an expert's testimony can be used to
obfuscate what would otherwise be a simple case.
Id. at 482.
205. Cryts v. Ford Motor Co., 571 S.W.2d 683, 688 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Higgins v. Paul
Hardeman, Inc., 457 S.W.2d 943, 948 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970).
206. Elmore v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Mo. 1984) (en banc) (state of the art
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percentages to each. 207 The jury is not permitted to assign fault to an
entity, no matter how apparently culpable, that is not a party to the
litigation.2
°8
To prevail on the punitive damage claim, A must convince the
jury by a preponderance of the evidence that C knew of the danger
caused by an alleged defect and showed "complete indifference to or
conscious disregard for the safety of others. ' 20 9 The punitive dam-
ages claim is freely permissible. 210 Further, the engineer's report will
be readily discoverable, and A's experts may be expected to use it to
seek to show reprehensible conduct by C. The jury may thereupon
award an amount that it concludes will punish the defendant and de-
ter it and others from like conduct. 21' In practice, the jury's award
need not be related to the compensatory damage award. A punitive
damage award against an U.S. manufacturer in this case could be in
the amount of $1,000,000 or more.
If B is sued, and has ample insurance, C's insurer would want to
know its right to seek funds from B and his insurer. In theory, C has
such a right.212 In practice, it may not, because if A settles with B, for
any amount, it will have no such right. At the trial, with C the lone
defendant, the jury would not be permitted to know of the settlement,
much less its amount. 213 Even if A does not settle with B, A can keep
B in the case until the close of the trial and then voluntarily dismiss B,
proceeding to the jury solely against C and only on the theory of strict
liability. Since there could then be no verdict of actionable negligence
against two parties, there could be no right to contribution. 21 4
A's compensatory damages award in this case of up to $1 million
would not likely be disturbed by a Missouri appeals court.
In 1987, the Missouri legislature stated that "immediate action is
necessary to restore the affordability and availability of liability insur-
evidence has no bearing on the outcome of a strict liability claim); see also Cryts, 571 S.W.2d at
689.
207. This is permissible now only by reason of the Tort Reform Act of 1987, H.B. 700,
84th Assembly, 2nd Sess. (1987). If A filed a strict liability case against C before the Act's
effective date, July 1, 1987, A's fault could not be considered by the jury. Lippard v. Houdaille
Indus., Inc., 715 S.W.2d 491 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
208. Tort Reform Act of 1987, H.B. 700, 84th Assembly, 2nd Sess. (1987).
209. Sparks v. Consolidated Aluminum Co., 679 S.W.2d 348, 354 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984)
(citing Racer v. Utterman, 629 S.W.2d 387, 396-97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)).
210. Rinker v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655, 669 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
211. MISSOURI ANNOTATED JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 10.04.
212. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 566 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. 1978) (en bane).
213. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.060 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
214. Sweet v. Herman Bros., 688 S.W.2d 31, 32 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
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ance," whereupon it passed an "emergency act" 215 and sent it to the
Governor, who signed this Tort Reform Act into law. 216 However,
nothing in the Act significantly alters the risks in the hypothetical
case, from the viewpoint of an insurer.
The practical effect of the Act coerces the insurer to settle: if A's
attorney demands that an insurer settle a case for a sum certain and it
refuses to do so, even if its grounds are wholly reasonable, and if the
matter then goes to trial and the jury awards A even a penny more
than the earlier demand, the insurer will pay prejudgment interest on
the entire verdict. The same rule applies to any settlement offer it
may make. 2
17
Under the Reform Act, evidence that a private insurer like D has
paid some or all of A's medical expenses is made admissible. 218 How-
ever, this evidence is admissible only if C agrees to pay all of A's
special damages before trial begins. The jury may not know that it
was D who actually paid the medical expenses, and if C elects to have
the jury told that someone did pay them, it may have no credit in the
amount of that payment if the plaintiff then receives a verdict from
the jury.2
19
As for punitive damages, the Reform Act requires a bifurcated
trial,220 and the likely effect of that rule is ameliorative. A few other
changes were made, but none that would significantly affect C's in-
surer's financial risk.
As to the questions of incidental interest, B will not be presumed
to have been intoxicated under Missouri law, for driving with a
0.08% blood alcohol level is permissible and not an offense under
Missouri's criminal laws. 221
Missouri has a seat belt law, 22 2 but its provisions are mild when
compared with belt usage laws in most of the eight nations whose
laws were reviewed. In Missouri, the failure of A and B to wear avail-
able safety belts may "not be considered evidence of comparative neg-
215. Act effective July 1, 1987, 1987 Mo. Legis. Serv. 1 (Vernon) (codified at Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 374.170 (Vernon Supp. 1988)).
216. Id.
217. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 408.040 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
218. Reform Act, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 38 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
219. Id.
220. Id. § 39.
221. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 577.012 (Vernon Supp. 1987). In Missouri, the legal blood alco-
hol limit is 0.10%. Id.
222. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 307.178 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
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ligence" 223 should either A or B sue C, even if the sole allegation by A
is that some defect in the design of the car's interior design enhanced
his injuries. 22a The law provides only for secondary enforcement,225
and the maximum fine permitted is $10.226
This is not to say that C is foreclosed from seeking relief. If A
was not wearing his safety belt, in violation of the law, then after the
jury has made its comparative fault determinations (of course, it will
have ignored A's failure to wear the belt), C may "introduce expert
evidence proving that a failure to wear a safety belt contributed to
[A 's] injuries [whereupon the jury] may reduce the amount of [A 's]
recovery. ' 227 However, the jury's reduction, regardless of the evi-
dence, may not "exceed one percent of the damages awarded." 228
If the hypothetical accident were to occur across the state boun-
dry line, and thus in Kansas, there would be a difference in the esti-
mated risk of several hundred thousand U.S. dollars, as we shall see-
a difference that is itself in excess of the adverse exposure for the acci-
dent, as a practical matter, in all of the nations whose laws we have
reviewed.
B. Kansas
A can sue C company, though he must do so within two years
after his accident. 229 His case may be based upon negligence, strict
liability, implied warranty, or all three.
A may make multiple unrelated defect claims 230 and probably
may invoke the "enhanced injury" doctrine. 23' A need not allege a
specific defect in his pleadings, but even if he does, he may allege a
new, unrelated defect at trial.232 A may claim various unrelated de-
fects in design, manufacture or assembly and various failures to warn.
223. Id. § 307.178(3).
224. See supra note 195. Since safety belts are part of a vehicle's interior design, A's delib-
erate failure to utilize this design feature would seem factually relevant to the jury's overall
determination of fault.
225. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 307.178(2) (Vernon Supp. 1987). "No person shall be stopped,
inspected or detained solely to determine compliance with this subsection." Id.
226. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 307.178(4) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
227. Id. § 307.178(3).
228. Id.
229. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(c)(2) (1983).
230. Id. § 60-208(e)(2).
231. There is no reported Kansas case expressly permitting an enhanced injury claim.
However, Kansas trial courts routinely permit such claims.
232. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-215(b) (1982); see also Thurman v. Cundiff, 2 Kan. App. 2d
406, 580 P.2d 893 (1978).
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He may sue B, and his spouse may sue for the loss of A's services.
Further, punitive damage claims will be freely allowed.
Kansas does not have the joint and several liability rule.233
Therefore, the jury will be asked to determine the fault of all entities,
whether or not all are or could be parties to the litigation.234 This
means in this case that if B is determined to have been at fault by
some amount, whether or not anyone successfully sues B, that per-
centage will be subtracted from A's recovery. A's fault will be consid-
ered as well. Indeed, if A is found to have been fifty percent or more
at fault, he can recover nothing.
235
The "state of the art" defense is permissible in a Kansas defective
design case.236 Thus, there is a substantial likelihood of a verdict for
C if its engineers find and can demonstrate that the plaintiff's product
allegation is incorrect.
A punitive damage award easily could amount to $1 million. A
Kansas jury's compensatory award in this case is likely to vary from
$100,000 to $600,000.
As to the questions of incidental interest, B will not be presumed
to have been intoxicated under Kansas law, for driving with a 0.08%
blood alcohol level is permissible and no offense under Kansas crimi-
nal law. 23
7
Kansas does have a seat belt usage law238 but, as in Missouri, its
provisions are tentative in comparison with those in the first eight
nations. The failure of A and B to wear available seat belts "shall not
be admissible in any action for the purpose of determining any aspect
of comparative negligence [nor, unlike Missouri, in]... mitigation of
damages. '239 The law provides for secondary enforcement only,24°
and the maximum fine is $10.241
233. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258(a) (1983).
234. Id.; see Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 580 P.2d 867 (1978).
235. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258(a) (1983).
236. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3307 (Supp. 1987).
237. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1005 (Supp. 1986). The legal blood alcohol limit in Kansas is
0.10%.
238. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-2504 (1986).
239. Id. § 8-2504(c).
240. Id. § 8-2503(e). "Law enforcement officers shall not stop drivers for violations of this
act in the absence of another violation of law." Id.
241. "[Violators] shall be fined not more than $10 including court costs." Id. § 8-
2504(a)(2).
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V. DISCUSSION
Doubtless the law in Missouri and Kansas is the result of the
collective judgments of the bench, bar and legislature in each state;
however, the two resulting systems are markedly inconsistent. In
fact, no two of the fifty U.S. states have the same product liability
laws, so one could thus proceed to examine differing sets of rules in
the forty-eight remaining U.S. jurisdictions. It is both the interna-
tional liberality and the individuality of the fifty U.S. product liability
law systems, however well-intentioned, that create insurance rate-
making chaos. One may assume that the bench, bar and legislatures
in each of the eight nations studied also continually seek to enhance
the welfare of their citizens, but the legal system in each nation is far
more likely to permit intelligent insurance rate-making. That is the
case both now and as the law in some of them will be after implemen-
tation of the EEC Directive. In all of the U.S. jurisdictions, juries
hear technical evidence, decide disputed engineering questions and
award damages. The contingent fee system is alive and well, and no
losing plaintiff must reimburse the defendant for all or much of its
litigation expenses.
The late twentieth century is a time of instant global communica-
tion and complex international trade, where world financial markets
frequently fluctuate together and product designs vary little. The U.S.
liability system stands in bold relief, clearly in contrast to all others.
Such a system simply is nonexistent anywhere else in the world. The
word "radical" means a "considerable departure from the usual or
traditional. ' ' 242 This experimental, historically-new U.S. system, still
after nearly a full generation unimitated by any other nation, is radi-
cal from a world perspective. And what of the generally-accepted
U.S. product liability reform agenda? Is it radical? Let us resort to a
standard dictionary definition once again: a reform agenda would be
"radical" if it would make "extreme changes in" the existing
system.2 4
3
What changes in the U.S. system would be "extreme"? Extreme
changes would be those that would summarily bring the U.S. system
into harmony with those of nations with whose economies the U.S.
must compete on a daily basis. Extreme changes might be:
242. Definition of "radical" from WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1872
(1961).
243. Id.
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1. The total elimination of personal injury litigation, as in New Zea-
land and Sweden.
2. The continued viability of personal injury litigation but with these
changes:
(a) Total elimination of the contingent fee system.
(b) Total elimination of the jury system.
(c) Damage awards by judges that would be appreciably far
lower and easier to predict in advance by rate-making insurers than
those seen in the U.S. today.
(d) Total elimination of punitive damages.
(e) Requiring losing litigants to pay most or all of the prevail-
ing litigants' costs.
3. No substantive changes whatsoever except substantial and un-
yielding limitations on damage awards. (This could be of some assist-
ance in insurance rate-making. Obviously, it would affect only the
amount of an award and not the likelihood of one.).
It is beyond cavil that any one of these reform programs would
be extreme and would seem radical to virtually all U.S. observers.
Doubtless, each would raise significant constitutional questions. Fur-
ther, even though businesses seem increasingly to rail at the bar,2" no
U.S. business group has seriously advocated any one of these extreme
reform programs, nor is any one of them advocated here. Yet the
facts compel one to admit that to describe the domestic legal system
in this way would not be thought "radical," as to the first numbered
reform, in New Zealand or Sweden, or, as to the second, in any of the
other nations whose systems we have studied.
The United States' strict liability system is radical,245 and it is
unique in the world. It has not developed over centuries. 246 It is a
uniquely U.S. experiment launched in the mid-1960's, and one can see
how it came to be.247 It cannot claim a rich common law heritage, 248
244. Consider, for example, this recent observation by a United States business executive,
speaking of Japan: "They've got about as many lawyers as we've got sumo wrestlers." L.
Iacocca, quoted in Wall St. J., Oct. 27, 1987, at 1, col. 5; see Wheel of Fortune, Wall St. J., Nov.
16, 1987, at 26, col. 1; see also Legal Smoke, Wall St. J., Feb. 22, 1988, at 22, col. 1.
245. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
246. "We are appalled, too, at the proponents' studied indifference to the cherished history
and development of the common law of product liability, a body of law which has developed
over centuries." See Hearings on S. 44, supra note 5, at 179.
247. Id.
248. "The proponents [of product liability reform] would stamp out the vitality of com-
mon law, choke off its health and its capacity to grow and be nurtured . See Hearings on
S. 2631, supra note 15, at 199.
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unlike many principles of tort law, because no common law nation in
the world has ever had it, including England, the mother country.
Every nation in the world-common law, civil law, "East European
code country, ' 249 or however else one might characterize the world's
legal systems-has had more than twenty years to observe and then
adopt the unique U.S. system, but not a single nation has done so.
What then is the justification for the unbridled continuation of
this system? Various reasons are advanced for the U.S. to remain in
statu quo and thus reject all product liability reforms. For example, it
is suggested that the U.S. system provides compensation to injured
persons. 250 However, the systems in effect in New Zealand and Swe-
den accomplish that end. They do it for all victims, rather than a few,
and with minimal transactional cost.
251
It has been suggested that U.S. products litigation increases
product safety. 252 In the summer of 1944,253 when the attention of the
nation was focused on a world war in Europe and in the Pacific, that
was a theory. It is no theory today. The United States has served as a
societal proving ground for this system for more than 20 years. To-
day one can test the 1944 theory.
Let us again use the automobile as the product example,
although obviously one could use other product examples. The
United States has utilized a strict liability system for more than
twenty years, while the Federal Republic of Germany has not had it
for a single day. If the theory that the U.S. product liability system
increases U.S. product safety was valid, then after twenty years one
should be able to see unmistakable results. If the claim was valid, it
would be clear by now, after nearly a generation of U.S. litigation,
that U.S. automobiles are far safer than those made in West Germany
today for its domestic market.
249. "We should for (product liability reformers'] sake deteriorate to the level of an east
European code country." See Hearings on S. 44, supra note 5, at 179.
250. Id.; Hearings on S. 2631, supra note 15, at 87.
251. The U.S. systems generally compensate few victims and have transactional costs so
significant that payments to counsel may exceed or at least approach payments to victims. See,
e.g., S. REP No. 422, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1986).
252. "Litigation, and the fear of litigation, has proven to be an effective method of improv-
ing products.., and above all else improving safety." See, e.g., Hearings on S. 44, supra note
5, at 193 (response to written questions from Senator Kasten); see also Hearings on S. 2760,
supra note 15, at 302-03; "The product liability system is responsible for improving the safety
of product." Hearings on H. 1115, supra note 15, at 90.
253. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436. The court's
opinion, and thus the concurrence of Justice Traynor, is dated July 4, 1944. Id.
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Today a visitor to a major international automotive display, such
as the Frankfurt Auto Show, should be able to conclude by viewing
its North American auto exhibit that U.S.-market cars are far safer
than those on display anywhere else in the exhibition hall. It should
also be readily apparent that the U.S. cars are significantly better
made, with designs that clearly offer increased occupant protection,
when compared with, say, BMW, Porsche or Mercedes-Benz vehicles.
Further, it should be clear that this profound difference is the sole
result of U.S. jury decisions that have successfully communicated to
manufacturers just how to build the much safer cars that the auto
shows exhibit. It would not prove the case for strict liability, for ex-
ample, to show any beneficial result in design caused by those com-
plex collections of written regulations written by scientists for
scientists, such as, for the most part, the U.S. Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standards.
Japan, too, has never implemented the U.S. system of strict lia-
bility. Japanese automotive engineers should by now, after more than
twenty years of U.S. strict liability awards, be heard to proclaim that
Japanese cars exported to the U.S. must be made dramatically and
significantly safer than their Japanese-market counterparts.
Swedish automotive engineers, who live and work in the nation
with the least product liability litigation risk here studied, should be
observed to hold the same views about U.S.-market cars. Safety-con-
scious consumers the world over should by now be clamoring for the
significantly safer litigation-driven U.S. designs. But none of these ef-
fects seem to be occurring after a full generation of this unique U.S.
legal experiment.
One must pause here to observe that United States product liabil-
ity litigation has contributed to or caused the elimination of particular
product designs from the marketplace. Doubtless, at least in some of
the more extreme cases, many U.S. citizens would agree with the pro-
priety of those disappearances. However, because litigation has
caused isolated product designs to disappear, even if the disappear-
ance was wholly deserved, does not demonstrate the overall historical
efficacy of the unique U.S. system. The fundamental question is
whether, after twenty-five years, U.S. products as a whole are dramat-
ically safer than similar products in other advanced nations, as dra-
matically safer as the enormous cost of U.S. product liability litigation
would suggest they should be.
It is far too late in the day to advance the proposition that U.S.
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product liability verdicts have made all or even most U.S. products
safer. In the case of the automobile, for example, genuine automotive
safety progress has been relatively uniform on a worldwide basis. It
has been the result of hard work by scientists and engineers, both in
the U.S. and elsewhere in the world. Scientific advances have been
made, to be sure, but they have not been limited to the United States.
And, as always throughout history, scientific discoveries have not oc-
curred upon the mere imprecations of kings, or corporate critics, or
lawyers, or even of a jury sitting in an U.S. courtroom.
The time for at least modest reform is now. The United States
product liability system has been permitted to go much too far. It is
new historically, and obviously experimental, because it has no juris-
prudential antecedent in the common law or elsewhere. At least some
modest corrections-but certainly not radical or extreme ones254-are
appropriate, must be made, and indeed have been made in a number
of U.S. states.
VI. Two PARTICULAR REFORMS
The modest reforms presently urged for the U.S.255 would not
render the international insurance rate-maker's task simple, but they
would serve to decrease the extent of the current chaotic situation
that makes the task essentially impossible. While reform could occur
at the federal level, seriatim in fifty states, or both, the former is obvi-
ously the less complex course. The modest ameliorative reforms
urged often include the two particular ones discussed below.
A. Joint and Several Liability
This old English common-law doctrine is not unknown today in
other nations. In U.S. practice, however, it creates profound unfair-
ness and contributes to the insurance rate-making chaos when it is
permitted to coexist not only along with large damage awards but
with another tort doctrine, pure comparative fault. This is the case
today in a number of U.S. jurisdictions. 25 6
254. See supra note 242 and accompanying text for reforms that would be radical, but only
from the post-1965 U.S. perspective.
255. See supra note 8.
256. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1002, 1003 (1962); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.2949 (West 1986); MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (Supp. 1988); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 11-7-15,
85-5-5 (1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2101, 2102 (Purdon 1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4
(1985); Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W.Va. 1982); Bradley v.
Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W.Va. 1979).
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The combined doctrines operate so that a solvent manufacturer
found minimally at fault-say five percent-may nevertheless be com-
pelled to pay one hundred percent of a jury's damage award, no mat-
ter how large the award. To demonstrate, let us assume that a tire
manufacturer-say Firestone-is found five percent at fault in a prod-
uct liability case. One must necessarily conclude that Firestone has
been found free from ninety-five percent of the fault and for that
ninety-five percent, Firestone is not a tortfeasor. Should courts re-
quire, for example, Goodyear or Uniroyal or Citibank to pay that
ninety-five percent? If not, why not? The first two companies also
make and sell tires, and all three have assets. They would be no more
or less at fault for the ninety-five percent of the damage than Fire-
stone. The fact is that not one of the four entities is at fault for the
ninety-five percent. Goodyear, Uniroyal and Citibank are not at fault
because they were not and could not have been made parties to the
litigation. Firestone is not at fault because a court having jurisdiction
over it has so determined. If Firestone (or, for that matter, one of the
other entities) is ordered to pay the ninety-five percent, it will do so,
by definition, as a faultless party.
There is a way to correct this obvious unfairness and simultane-
ously free the prudent international insurer from attempting to calcu-
late rates for a jurisdiction in which a scintilla of fault-one percent-
means the insured may be liable for an entire multi-million dollar ver-
dict. A number of United States jurisdictions already, either in court
decisions 257 or by statute,258 have eliminated the archaic and unfair
joint and several liability doctrine. Each defendant is responsible for
its own fault. Those who would preserve the system in the interest of
compensating a few citizens must explain why they would rather not
urge adoption of the New Zealand or Swedish system and compensate
them all.
B. Punitive Damages
In many U.S. jurisdictions, a jury of six or more citizens may
determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a product defend-
ant has acted "with malice"-by court decision 259 or statuteE26°-or
257. E.g., Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579
(1982); Marchese v. Warner Communications, Inc., 100 N.M. 313, 670 P.2d 113 (1983).
258. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2506 (1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.5
(1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258(a) (1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-40 (1986); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109(d) (1986).
259. E.g., Jolley v. Puregro, 94 Idaho 702, 496 P.2d 939 (1972); Ruiz v. Southern Pacific
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"recklessly," 261 whereupon they may award vast amounts, as they de-
cide, far in excess of any reasonably predictable compensatory award.
These huge awards, sometimes fired off even in nine-figure
salvos,262 are usually to be divided between the successful lawyer and
his client on about a forty-sixty basis. The damages are not intended
for the plaintiff's medical care, of course, for that will have been the
purpose of the jury's compensatory award. For the international in-
surance rate-maker, the proposition that a given U.S. jury award may
present an adverse financial risk varying from substantial and unre-
coverable defense attorney fees and other costs upon victory for the
insured, to up to $100 million in compensatory and punitive damages
upon victory for the plaintiff, presents no little disharmony to the
traditional rate-making enterprise.
In some jurisdictions, for the jury to award punitive damages it
must find the defendant's conduct to have been "outrageous.
263
However, if the jury acted out of "passion" the appeals court will
overturn the award.264 Apparently, a jury capable of dispassionate
Trans. Co., 94 N.M. 194, 638 P.2d 406 (1981); Berberian v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 117
R.I. 629, 369 A.2d 1109 (1977); Ford Motor Co. v. Bartholomew, 224 Va. 421, 297 S.E.2d 675
(1982); Wells v. Smith, 297 S.E.2d 872 (W.Va. 1982); Wilson v. Hall, 34 Wyo. 465, 244 P.
1002 (1926).
260. E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 42.010 (1980); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 32-03-07 (1983).
261. E.g., Johnson v. Huskie Indus., 536 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1976); Johnson v. Colt Indus.
Operating Group, 609 F. Supp. 776 (D. Kan. 1985) aff'd., 797 F.2d 1530 (10th Cir. 1986);
Phillips v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 473 F. Supp. 984 (D. Vt. 1979); Sioux City Community School
Dist. v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 461 F. Supp. 662 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Forrest City Mach.
Works, Inc. v. Aderhold, 273 Ark. 33, 616 S.W.2d 720 (1981); Cantrell v. Amarillo Hardware
Co., 226 Kan. 681, 602 P.2d 1326 (1979); Ruiz, 94 N.M. 194, 638 P.2d 406.
262. For example, the jury's award in Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d
757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981), included a punitive damages award of $125,000,000 and the
jury in Durrill v. Ford Motor Co., 714 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), handed down a
punitive damages award of $100,000,000. Both awards were reduced substantially. The trial
court in Grimshaw reduced the punitive damages award to $3,500,000 as a condition of its
award of a new trial, and the reduction was upheld on appeal. The trial court in Durrill
ordered plaintiffs to file a remittitur of $80,000,000 of the punitive damages award as a condi-
tion precedent to its denial of defendant's motion for a new trial, and on appeal, there was a
further reduction of $10,000,000. No prudent international insurance rate-maker, however,
can wholly ignore the reality that in U.S. jurisprudence such jury awards have occurred.
263. E.g., Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973); Olsen v. United
States, 521 F. Supp. 59 (E.D. Pa. 1981) aff'd without op., 688 F.2d 823 (3d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1107 (1983); Jolley, 94 Idaho 702, 496 P.2d 939; Oakview New Lenox School
Dist. v. Ford Motor Co., 61 11. App. 3d 194, 378 N.E.2d 544 (1978).
264. See, e.g., Mendenall v. MacGregor Triangle Co., 83 Idaho 145, 358 P.2d 860 (1961);
Nat'l Bank of Monticello v. Doss, 141 I11. App. 3d 1065, 491 N.E.2d 106 (1986); Kirkbride v.
Lisbon Contractors, Inc., 357 Pa. Super. 322, 516 A.2d 1 (1986).
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outrage is the one that these strict liability systems would have make
such decisions, and the insurance rate-makers must add this into their
rate-making calculations as well.
At the very least, if this punitive damage system-which acts as a
quasi-criminal tribunal, without criminal law protections for the de-
fendant, and creates a lottery-like tribunal for the plaintiff-is to be
preserved as a kind of authentic Americana (for it is clearly unique
among all world legal systems), then in minimal fairness the court
should instruct the jury not to return such a verdict unless it finds
clear and convincing evidence of the requisite conduct by the defend-
ant. The leading legal scholar in the field recently expressed his agree-
ment with this proposition. 265  Some jurisdictions have already
adopted the clear and convincing standard, either by court decision
266
or statute.267 Further, the American Bar Association endorses it,268
and this reform, at the very least, seems necessary.
Another suggested legal reform requires that conduct found pu-
nitive must have been an extreme departure from accepted standards
of conduct. Recently, one leading jurisdiction amended its punitive
standard to include the word "despicable. ' ' 269 In addition, recently
enacted statutes in several jurisdictions provide that the jury may not
hear punitive damages evidence until after trial on the compensatory
damages claim. 270 All these concepts could introduce amelioration
into this unique body of law.
265. "The "clear and convincing evidence" standard of proof ... is the only proper stan-
dard... [which is] demonstrated by a newly emerging trend in both case law and legislation."
See Hearings on H.R. 1115, supra note 15, at 2 (statement of Professor David G. Owen).
266. E.g., Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353 (Me. 1985); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97
Wis.2d 260, 194 N.W.2d 437 (1980).
267. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020 (Supp. 1987); Act of Sept. 30, 1987, ch. 1498,
§ 3294, 1987 Cal. Legis. Serv. 846, 850-51 (West); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-34-2 (West Supp.
1987); Act effective Jan. 1, 1988, § 2315.21, 1987 Ohio Legis. Bull. 511, 518-19 (Anderson);
OR. REV. STAT. § 30.925 (1987).
268. At the 1987 midyear meeting in New Orleans, the American Bar Association House
of Delegates adopted the recommendation of the ABA Action Commission to Improve -the
Tort Liability System that the Association should endorse the clear and convincing standard.
for punitive damage claims. Geller & Levy, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 73
A.B.A. J. 88, 91 (1987).
269. Act of Sept. 30, 1987, ch. 1498, 1987 Cal. Legis. Serv. 846 (West). Malice and op-
pression are defined as "despicable conduct." Id. § 3294(c).
270. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020 (Supp. 1987); Act of Sept. 30, 1987, ch. 1498, 1987
Cal. Legis. Serv. 846 (West); Act effective July 1, 1987, 1987 Mo. Legis. Serv. 1 (Vernon); Act
of July 22, 1987, ch. 197, 1987 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 188 (West); Act effective Jan. 1, 1988,
1987 Ohio Legis. Bull. 511 (Anderson).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The argument for U.S. product liability law reform is strong, and
it is now based upon experience. Ours is simply another one of those
times and places in the long history of the common law in which, to
paraphrase Sir Thomas Browne, demonstrated infirmities require
correction.
271
271. T. BROWNE, RELIGIO MEDIcI 89 (G. Keynes ed. 1928).
[T]hose three Noble Professions which all civil Commonwealths doe honour, are
raised upon the fall of Adam, and are not any way exempt from their infirmities;
there are not onely diseases incurable in Physicke, but cases indissoluble in Lawes,
Vices incorrigible in Divinity: if general councells may erre, I doe not see why partic-
ular Courts should be infallible; their perfectest rules are raised upon the erroneous
reason of Man, and the Lawes of one doe but condemn the rules of another ....

